Secure computers sit in high-security rooms and aren’t networked. “Hacking” them requires physical access – use Fast-Talk and a forged ID, burglary, etc. Less-secure machines on networks might succumb to a quick run down a list of known vulnerabilities or a painstaking search for new ones; either way, basic equipment is a computer, a network connection, and a caffeinated beverage of choice. The most effective route into many systems is to suborn an authorized user . . . or use special tools to spy on him.

This apparatus intercepts and decodes the incidental radio-frequency emissions of electronic devices – including computers. The operator can read the contents of video displays (computer monitors, ATM screens, medical equipment, etc.) and capture the telltale signature of electronic typewriters, printers, fax machines, and so on. This requires an Electronics Operation (EW) roll, at a -1 per 100 yards past 300 yards. Maximum range is 1,000 yards (-7), but electrical “noise” and tall buildings limit range to 100 yards in many urban areas. There’s an extra -3 to find a specific machine among many.

Computer Monitoring Gear (TL7). Hardware the size of a refrigerator, normally mounted in a van. $50,000, 300 lbs., external power. LC3.

Computer Monitoring Gear (TL8). A laptop computer running Complexity 3 software and a database, plus a small electronics box and an antenna. $5,000, 6 lbs., external power. LC3.

The keyboard of a computer, data-entry terminal, electric typewriter, etc., can be modified to intercept anything typed on it – passwords being the most valuable target. Keyboard bugs transmit by radio, by phone, or (especially on a computer) over the Internet. Installation requires tools, few minutes’ access to the keyboard, and an Electronics Operation (Surveillance) roll.

At TL8, such hardware is sold commercially as either a pass-through device plugged into the keyboard cable or a complete keyboard with onboard memory. Software can do the same thing, recording every keystroke and mouse movement. This may be installed as a virus or even as an openly documented feature; e.g., to allow companies to monitor use of their equipment. $100, neg. LC4.

These hardware devices retrieve data from computers or their interfaces. For online intrusion, use software tools for Computer Hacking or Computer Programming. For hacking encryption, see Quantum Computers.

Computer equipment emits radio signals when in use. This gadget picks these up. It can detect whatever data is being typed or displayed on an interface screen at a distance, allowing someone to eavesdrop on computer activity. It cannot read what is stored inside the computer. It can scan through walls, provided they are not shielded. Using the device requires an Aim maneuver for the duration of the surveillance; roll against Electronics Operation (Surveillance) to get clear data. Optionally, all TL9+ interfaces may be automatically shielded against these emissions (due to different design principles). However, the system remains useful when infiltrating lower-TL worlds!

Mini Scanner (TL9): 100-yard range; -1 to skill per 10 yards range. $500, 0.1 lb., A/10 hr. LC2.

Long-Range Scanner (TL9): 1,000-yard range; -1 to skill per 100 yards of range. $5,000, 5 lbs., C/10 hr. LC2.

This pinhead-sized adhesive bug can be stuck to the bottom of a terminal’s keyboard. It uses induction to read the keystrokes, recording everything that gets typed in its memory. It can record a gigabyte at TL9; multiply by 1,000 per TL afterward. The bug can be retrieved manually, or it can be programmed to send out the data as a coded burst transmission using its microcommunicator (p. 43). It runs for a year. $200, weight is negligible. LC3.

A superconducting quantum interference device is used to interrogate a computer brain to retrieve data, even if that system is offline.

Contact SQUID (TL9): This SQUID must be physically attached to the target computer; it can then assist in reading the data stored within. $20,000, 5 lbs., 2C/10 hr. LC3.

Ranged SQUID (TL11): This can probe a computer even at a distance. It is usable at 10 yards at TL11, or 100 yards at TL12. Hardened computers cannot be probed at a distance, but can still be scanned through direct contact. $200,000, 50 lbs., 2D/10 hr. LC2.

Memory Scan (TL10^): Any ultra-scan (p. 104) active sensor with this modification can scan a computer that it has detected. +200% to the ultra-scan sensor’s cost. LC2.

Technology can lead to new vices, such as pleasure robots, sensie addiction, or direct neural stimulation, any or all which may be legally regulated. It can also lead to variations on existing crimes, such as hijacking robots, illegally copying a mind, or transforming a person into a cyborg against his will. Some societies may declare certain technologies criminally dangerous – for example, volitional AI, nanofactories, uploading minds, or time travel – and prosecute anyone who employs them.

Advancing technology can also impact the way existing crimes are perceived. Future societies could have very different attitudes to the ownership of data or the protection of personal privacy, depending on the ways that different technologies are used. If ultra-tech medicine can make injury or death into an inconvenience, assault and even murder may be taken less seriously, as long as the victim is easy to restore. Similarly, the existence of nanofacs or replicators may turn the theft of physical goods into a trivial misdemeanor.